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ABSTRACT
Th e authoritarian regime of the president of Belarus A. Lukashenko makes the 
European Union’s policy towards Belarus completely diff erent from the policy with 
regard to its other neighbours. Th e main aim of the paper is to show and analyze 
EU’s policy towards Belarus in the context of presidential elections in Belarus in 
December 2010. In the fi rst part of the paper, the author very briefl y describes the 
UE’s policy towards Belarus before elections. Th e following part is devoted to the 
most important events in the EU’s policy towards Belarus in the context of the last 
Belarusian presidential elections. Th e summary contains an analysis of reasons 
why the UE’s policy towards Belarus and its president A. Lukashenko is so diffi  cult 
and, up to the present, rather ineff ective.
Keywords: EU – Russia relations, Belarus in EU policy, EU external relations, 
EU foreign policy
INTRODUCTION
THE INTERNAL SITUATION in Belarus and the nature of its political system since 
taking the presidential offi  ce in 1994 by A. Lukashenko1 – clearly very diff erent 
from what it is faced in Europe today – makes the relations of Belarus with other 
1 In 2004, Belarus held a referendum which resulted in lift ing the constitutional limitation that 
the offi  ce of President of Belarus can be served no more than two terms.
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countries regarded as quite special. Th e relations between Belarus and the European 
Union (EU) are also shaped very specifi cally, it should be also noted that the EU 
policy towards Belarus and its eff ects are signifi cantly diff erent compared to the 
EU’s actions and their results to other neighbouring countries. Th e specifi city of 
the political situation in Belarus and its impact on the foreign relations of this 
country were strongly manifested on the presidential elections on 19 December 
2010 and related to those events. It is not surprising that as a result of the elections, 
the offi  ce of President of Belarus continues to be exercised by A. Lukashenko. Th e 
manner of the election, and especially the very repressive actions by the Belarusian 
authorities against the opposition aft er the elections, resulted in the biggest crisis 
in the EU-Belarus relations in many years and the signifi cant change – compared 
to the period immediately preceding the elections – in the EU policy towards 
Belarus. Th erefore, the aim of this paper is to present the EU policies towards 
Belarus in the context of the presidential elections on 19 December 2010 with the 
attempt of its analysis (in Conclusions). Th is article also briefl y outlines the EU 
policy towards Belarus in the period before 2010, which is an essential background 
for the events related to the Belarusian presidential election of 2010.
BELARUS AND THE EU POLICY BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION IN 2010 – AN OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM
Th e EU-Belarus relations can be divided into two stages: fi rst is the years of
1992–1996 and the second starts in the years of 1996/1997 and continues to the 
present day. In the fi rst period the relationships were properly arranged and the 
EU policies towards Belarus were very similar to that of other Central and Eastern 
European countries.
In August 1992, diplomatic relations between the European Communities (EC) 
were establish and on 6 March 1995, during the President of Belarus A. Lukash-
enko’s visit to Brussels, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was establish 
between the EU and Belarus. Th e EU has also begun to assist Belarus in its pro-
grammes to support and accelerate the country’s political, economic and social 
transitions. In the early ‘90s, even the perspective of Belarus becoming a part of 
the EU seemed to be a realistic2.
2 VS Bondarenko, New Neighbours of the European Union: Geopolitical Prospects for Belarus, [in] 
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Breakthrough in the EU-Belarus relations and in the EU politics towards that 
country took place in 1996 – on 24th November Belarus held a referendum on 
changes in the constitution, which among others, dramatically increased the pow-
ers of the president and made his offi  ce strongly dominant in the political system 
of Belarus. In fact, changes in the constitution of Belarus introduced by the above 
referendum transformed the political system in Belarus with an overwhelming 
dominance of the president’s offi  ce. In addition, the way Lukashenko’s offi  ce was 
run, from the end of 1996, Belarus is an authoritarian state.
Th e very next day aft er the referendum, the EU Council concluded that it 
“remains seriously concerned’’3 about the situation in Belarus. Aft er the referendum 
in 1996, the EU policies towards Belarus were determined by the Council on 15 
September 1997 4. Th e Council deplored because of the attitude of the Belarus 
authorities to its policy towards the EU, which was considered “unconstructive’’ 
and acknowledged that only the Belarus constitution from 1994 and parliament 
elected the same year had the democratic legitimacy.
As a result, from 1996/1997 to the present, the EU policy towards Belarus leads 
in two directions. Firstly, in the offi  cial political contacts with authorities of the 
country, it primarily appeals to change the internal politics of Belarus and applies 
pressure and sanctions aimed at enforcing such a reform. Secondly, consist of 
actions designed to support all these actors and participants in social and political 
life in Belarus, who can contribute to the development of civil society, and who 
declare their willingness to activities aimed at the democratization of Belarus.
Next activities within the EU policy towards Belarus, aft er the referendum of 
1996, are primarily responding to A. Lukashenko’s actions, and attempts to put 
pressure on Belarus by introducing and suspending sanctions, focusing mainly on 
prohibiting Belarusian politicians the entry into the EU. For the fi rst time this 
measure was used in 1998, aft er the Belarusian authorities had ordered the EU 
diplomats to leave the “Drozdy” estate 5. Th is ban aff ected over a hundred top 
A Wider Europe and the New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union. Selected Aspects of Poland’s 
and the Baltic States’ relations with Russia and Belarus, ed. E. Teichmann, Warsaw 2004, p. 197.
3 Belarus/Constitutional referendum, Press No 339, Offi  cial No 12097/96. http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/026a0211.htm, accessed  15.11.2010.
4 2027 Council-General Aff airs, Press No. 269, Offi  cial No. 10368/97. http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/028a0063.htm, accessed  15.11.2010.
5 Common Position of 9 July 1998 defi ned by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty 
on European Union, Concerning Belarus (1998/448/CFSP) “Offi  cial Journal of the European Com-
munities” L195, 7.11.1998.
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politicians and offi  cials of Belarus, together with A. Lukashenko and was repealed 
in 1999 6. For the second time the sanctions to prevent the entry into the EU were 
introduced in November 2002, in response to the removal of all foreign repre-
sentatives of the OSCE from Minsk by the Belarusian authorities 7. Th is time the 
prohibition included the president of Belarus, members of the government, min-
isters of Lukashenko’s administration and bosses of some of the state institutions.
Another manifestation of bad EU-Belarus relations was only formal inclusion 
of the country in the EU European Neighbourhood Policy8 (ENP), adopted in 2004 
and intended to prevent consolidation of the division of Europe aft er the EU 
enlargement that year. Belarus was included in the ENP; however, as before, the 
inclusion of the country in the ENP remains formal and the bilateral EU-Belarusian 
Action Plan, which was supposed to form the basis of EU-Belarus relationship, has 
not been adopted 9. Th e chances of a real and active participation of Belarus in the 
ENP have been buried back in 2004 – fi rst on April 28, the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of European Council received a report10 (prepared by Ch. Pourgourides) about 
the loss of four people in Belarus in 1999/2000: former Home Secretary Yuri 
Zakharenko, former Parliament Deputy Speaker of Belarus, Viktor Gonchar, 
businessman Anatoly Krasovsky, who disappeared along with W. Gonchar and 
ORT Russian television journalist Dmitry Zavadski. In response to this document, 
on 24 September 2004, the EU Council adopted a common position under which 
it banned the four Belarusian offi  cials responsible for the disappearance of men-
tioned above people the entry into the EU 11.
6 Council Decision of 22 February 1999 repealing Common Position Concerning Belarus 98/448/
CFSP (1999/156/CFSP) “Offi  cial Journal of the European Communities” L52, 27.02.1999.
7 Draft  Council Common Position Concerning Measures against Belarus restrictive, 14030/02, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st14/st14030.en02.pdf, accessed  26.12.2010.
8 Communication from the Commission. European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, COM 
(2004) 373 fi nal, Brussels, 12.5.2004. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_
en.pdf, reading dated 26.12.2010. Details of the scheme has been set out in: Regulation (EC) 1638/2006 
of the European Parliament and the Council from 24 October 2006 defi ning general rules for estab-
lishing the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, “Journal of the European Union’’ 
L310, 9.11.2006.
9 Th e document only stated that the Belarus can take part in the three Neighbourhood Pro-
grammes, i.e., Baltic Sea Programme, Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus and Poland-Ukraine-Belarus and the 
new European Neighbourhood Instrument.
10 Text of the report: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/
WorkingDocs/Doc04/EDOC10062.htm, accessed  26.12.2010.
11 Council Common Position 2004/661/CFSP on 24 September 2004 was concerning restrictive 
measures against certain Belarusian offi  cials “Journal of the European Union” L 301, 28.09.2004.
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Such an outline of the EU-Belarus relations and the EU policies towards Belarus 
– i.e. certain events in Belarus (most oft en parliamentary or presidential elections) 
and activities of country’s authorities, were assessed by the EU as a violation of 
democratic principles, respect for human rights, etc., followed by the EU diplomatic 
sanctions against the Belarusian politicians and mitigation or suspension of these 
sanctions, has lasted and functioned later as well. Aft er the parliamentary elections 
and referendum in 2004 (considered fraudulent), the number of people who were 
banned the entry into the EU territory has increased to six;12 these sanctions were 
in force for 12 months and aft erward they were extended 13. Th e presidential elec-
tions in Belarus in 2006 were also evaluated negatively by the EU, which increased 
the list of people banned from the entry into its territory by 31 people, including
A. Lukashenko 14. A few weeks later, the Council made sanctions stricter and by 
the subsequent common position froze all fi nancial assets stored in the Union’s 
countries which were owned, at the disposal of, or controlled by persons covered 
by the prohibition of the entry into the EU 15. In March 2007, cited above sanctions 
were extended for another 12 months;16 so it happened in April 2008 17.
Since autumn 2008, it could seem that the policy of the EU sanctions against 
Lukashenko and his politics has begun to deliver some results; the EU noticed 
positive changes in the course of formal election campaign and as a result intro-
duced an extension of the Common Position 2006/276/CFSP for another year; 
however, the travel restrictions for certain offi  cials of Belarus were suspended until 
12 Council Common Position 2005/666/CFSP of 20 September 2005 extended the Common Posi-
tion 2004/661/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain offi  cials of Belarus, “Journal of 
the European Union” L 247, 23.09.2005.
13 Council Common Position 2005/666/CFSP of 20 September 2005 extended the Common Posi-
tion 2004/661/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain offi  cials of Belarus, “Journal of 
the European Union” L 247, 23.09.2005.
14 Council Common Position 2006/276/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning restrictive measures 
against certain offi  cials of Belarus and repealing Common Position 2004/661/CFSP “Journal of the 
European Union” L 101, 11.04.2006.
15 Council Common Position 2006/362/CFSP of 18 May 2006 amended Common Position 
2006/276/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain offi  cials of Belarus “Journal of the 
European Union” L 134, 20.5.2006. Th e technical details of how to implement this position in practice 
were contained in the regulations adopted by the Council on the same day: Council Regulation (EC) 
No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and 
certain offi  cials of Belarus, “Journal of the European Union’’ L 134, 20.5.2006.
16 Council Common Position 2007/173/WPZiB of 19 March 2007 extending restrictive measures 
against certain offi  cials of Belarus “Journal of the European Union’’ L 79, 20.03.2007.
17 Council Common Position 2008/288/CFSP of 7 April 2008 extending restrictive measures 
against certain offi  cials of Belarus “Journal of the European Union’’ L 95, 8.04.2008.
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13 April 2009 (with the exception of restrictions of those involved in the disap-
pearances of mentioned earlier four people in 1999–2000 and President of the 
Central Election Commission Lidia Jarmoszin) 18. Another sign of improvement 
of the EU-Belarus relations was the visit of the EU High Representative for CFSP 
Javier Solana in Minsk in February 2009. During that visit, A. Lukashenko said he 
wants to “develop good relations with Europe.”19 Once again, the suspension of 
sanctions for 32 offi  cials of Belarus was extended20 and aft erwards Belarus was 
formally included in the Eastern Partnership. In December 2009, once again, the 
EU Council extended the suspension of the above sanctions 21.
THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS IN BELARUS AFTER THE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 19 DECEMBER 2010
Some aspects of the presidential election campaign on 19 December 2010 could 
give the impression that the situation in Belarus in terms of respecting the princi-
ples of democracy, civil liberties, etc. has improved. Th e opposition managed to 
gather the signatures necessary to register their candidates in the elections and 
these registrations did take place – apart from the incumbent president Lukash-
enko, there were nine more people who were running in the elections. Authorities 
also permitted for demonstrations of the opposition candidates supporters who 
have obtained a certain level of public access to the media. For the fi rst time since 
1994, in the Belarusian national television, a presidential debate of the candidates 
took place (Lukashenko and U. Nyaklajeu did not take a part); it also accredited 
over a thousand foreign election observers 22.
18 Council Common Position 2008/844/CFSP of 10 November 2008 amending Common Position 
2006/276/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain offi  cials of Belarus “Journal of the 
European Union’’L 300, 11.11.2008.
19 Lukashenko to EU: We want a dialogue without intermediaries “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 20.02.2009, 
p. 13.
20 Council Common Position 2009/314/CFSP of 6 April 2009 amending Common Position 
2006/276/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain offi  cials of Belarus and repealing 
Common Position 2008/844/CFSP “Offi  cial Journal of the European Union” L 93, 7.04.2009.
21 Council Decision 2009/969/CFSP of 15 December 2009 extending restrictive measures against 
certain offi  cials of Belarus described in Common Position 2006/276/CFSP and repealing Common 
Position 2009/314/CFSP “Journal European Union” L 332, 17.12.2009.
22 “Elections Update’’. http://mfa.gov.by/upload/Update-4.pdf, accessed 16.12.2010.
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Th e EU has shown activity in the period immediately before the election – it has 
continued a policy of incentives and simultaneously not withdrawing the oppor-
tunity to continue the sanctions. It resulted in another extension of sanctions 
involving offi  cials of Belarus (in total 41 people, including A. Lukashenko) who 
were prohibited the entry into the EU and their assets were frozen (for 40 people, 
including A. Lukashenko), together with their resuspension, which took place in 
late October 2010 23.
Foreign Ministers of Germany – Guido Westerwelle and Poland – Radoslaw 
Sikorski visited Minsk at the beginning of November. During their talk with 
A. Lukashenko, they off ered fi nancial assistance to Belarus from the EU – 3 billion 
Euros in the next 3 years, provided that the forthcoming elections would be 
democratic. Lukashenko assured them that they would be Belarusian President 
also insisted that elections in Belarus have always been democratic 24.
According to the Central Election Committe’s announcement from 24 Decem-
ber 2010, the turnout was 90.65%. Selected in the fi rst round, A. Lukashenko 
became the President of Belarus with 79.65% of votes. Th e remaining candidates 
received from 0.39% to 2.43% votes 25.
Th e actions of Belarusian authorities that took place aft er the elections (includ-
ing violent dispersal of demonstrators, arrests, prosecutions and convictions of 
several hundred people, including several candidates involved in the presidential 
election) have been widely and strongly criticized and the elections recognized by 
international organizations as not fulfi lling the democratic requirements. Th is 
position was adopted in the report of the Offi  ce for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights 26. Th e Resolution of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
stated that, among others, it is “dismayed by the unprecedented wave of violence, 
intimidation, mass arrests and prosecutions’’ against the opposition, human rights 
defenders and journalists which took place aft er the elections on 19 December 
23 2010/639/WPZiBz Council Decision of 25 October 2010 concerning restrictive measures 
against certain offi  cials of Belarus “Journal of the European Union” L 280, 26.10.2010.
24 Trzy miliardy euro za demokrację “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 3.11.2010, p. 9.
25 СООБЩЕНИЕ Центральной комиссии Республики Беларусь по выборам и проведению 
республиканских референдумов об итогах выборов Президента Республики Беларусь, http://
www.rec.gov.by/pdf/prb2010/soob9.pdf, accessed 25.12.2010.
26 Republic of Belarus. Presidential Election 19 December 2010. OSCE / ODIHR Election Ob-
servation Mission Final Report, Warsaw 22 February 2011, http://www.osce.org/odihr/75713, ac-
cessed 19.03.2011.
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2010 27. A number of reports confi rming violations of human rights, which took 
place aft er the election, and condemning these practices by Belarusian authorities 
have been prepared and presented by Amnesty International 28.
One of the fi rst reactions of the representatives of the EU countries to the events 
associated with the presidential elections in Belarus was a common article called: 
“Lost Lukashenko”, published on 23 December 2010 in “Th e New York Times”29 by 
the Foreign Ministers of Sweden (Carl Bildt), Czech Republic (Karel Schwarzen-
berg), Poland (Radosław Sikorski) and Germany (Guido Westerwelle). Already in 
the fi rst sentence, they claimed that aft er the events which followed the elections 
on 19 December 2010 in Belarus, “there is no possibility for business-as-usual 
between the European Union and the President of Belarus A. Lukashenko. Th ey 
noted that few months before the elections, there was a hope for those elections to 
be diff erent – A. Lukashenko had invited international observers to the elections 
and improved operating conditions for opposition in the election campaign. In 
response, the EU suspended the sanctions, presented the off er of political dialogue, 
economic cooperation and fi nancial assistance. However, according to the authors, 
even if the voting process was proceeded correctly, it was done otherwise in vote 
counting – according to a report by independent observers in almost half of poll-
ing stations the process was ‘’bad” or “very bad’’ and one can assume that other 
stations were even worse. However, the ministers considered the events that 
occurred aft er the elections as the worst, which included beatings and detention 
of opposition candidates, repression and convictions against people involved in 
their election campaigns. According to four ministers, these events resemble the 
imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. Th ey announced that the EU would 
not remain indiff erent to not respecting the human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law and expressed the opinion that at this point continuation of a positive 
cooperation with “Mr. A. Lukashenko seems to be a waste of time and money’’.
Th e events in Belarus in the period aft er the elections on 19 December 2010 also 
met with reaction from the EU institutions. First, on the 20th January the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution, in which they stated that these elections “failed 
to meet international standards of free, fair and transparent elections’’ and consid-
27 Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assembly. Th e situation in Belarus in the aft ermath of the 
presidential election, Resolution 1790(2011). http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta11/ERES1790.htm, accessed  19.03.2011.
28 Th ese documents are available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/belarus.
29 C. Bildt, K. Schwarzenberg, R. Sikorski, G. Westerwelle, Lukashenko the Loser http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/12/24/opinion/24iht-edbildt24. html? _r = 3 & ref = global, accessed  25.12.2010.
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ered them as “another missed opportunity for democratic transformation in 
Belarus’’. Th ey also condemned the repression, police and KGB operations against 
the leaders of the opposition, peaceful demonstrators and their arrests (including 
presidential candidates), and called for their immediate release. Th e Parliament 
also called on the Council, Commission and High Representative of the EU, among 
others, to review the EU policy towards Belarus, including “consideration of tar-
geted economic sanctions’’ and ‘’consideration of possibility to suspend” the par-
ticipation of Belarus in the activities of the Eastern Partnership, if there is no “vast 
improvement’’ of the situation in this country and to reintroduce the prohibition 
for visas for Belarusian leaders, extending this ban on all persons, who might be 
considered responsible for the falsifi cation of election results and the brutal repres-
sion and arrests that followed 30.
Aft erwards, on 31 January 2011, the Council of the European Union decided 
– among others, that “in connection with counterfeiting presidential election’’ and 
“brutal persecution of the opposition, civil society and representatives of independ-
ent media in Belarus’’ it would change its previous decision from October 2010 
and end the suspension of the travel ban and freeze the assets for the offi  cials of 
Belarus. At the same time, a list of people included in these sanctions has been very 
clearly extended, as it added another 117 names recognized by the EU as guilty of 
“violation of international electoral standards’’ and “the persecution of civil society 
and democratic opposition and the people associated with it ‘’(Article 1, paragraph 
1). Now, the travel restrictions were imposed on 158 people from Belarus and the 
assets freezing on 157 (both cases included A. Lukashenko) 31.
In addition to the European Parliament and the Council, Catherine Ashton, the 
EU High Representative for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy, also expressed 
condemnation for the arrests, trials, political convictions applied to the repre-
sentatives of Belarusian civil society and opposition, including presidential candi-
dates 32.
30 European Parliament Resolution of 20 January 2011 on the situation in Belarus, P7_TA-PROV 
(2011) 0022, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/seance_pleniere/textes_adoptes/provi-
soire/2011/01–20/0022/P7_TA-PROV(2011)0022_PL.pdf, accessed 19.03.2011.
31 Council Decision 2011/69/WPZiB of 31 January 2011 amending Council Decision 2010/639/
WPZiB concerning restrictive measures against certain offi  cials of Belarus “Journal of the European 
Union” L 28, 2.02.2011.
32 Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on recent trials and 
sentences in Belarus, Brussels, 18 March 2011, 7970/11. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/120028.pdf, accessed 19.03.2011.
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CONCLUSIONS
Th e EU policy towards A. Lukashenko’s Belarus, is broadly speaking, aimed at 
democratization of country’s political system. For several years, on the one hand, 
it has been aiming to reduce the isolation of contacts of the country’s highest 
authorities, pressure and apply restrictions. On the other hand, it has been aiming 
to encourage and persuade to democratization of the political system, and prom-
ise it would improve their relationships if the democratization actions were taken. 
However, so far it has not brought any results, and events in Belarus related to the 
presidential elections on 19 December 2010 were the very eloquent proof. In fact, 
democratization of Belarus failed – even if adopting that it would be possible with 
remaining in power A. Lukashenko. Even more obvious, it has failed to move the 
current president of Belarus away from power, what would be a prerequisite for 
the democratization of Belarus under the assumption that a change in policy by 
Mr Lukashenko is unrealistic. Finally, even when defi ning the goal of the EU 
policy towards Belarus and its gradual change in the political situation in the 
country (through, among others, strengthening and development of Belarusian 
civil society, protection and support of the Belarusian opposition, etc.), the events 
following the elections on 19 December 2010 meant that also in this respect it is 
diffi  cult to talk about the success of the EU policy. Perhaps, it would not be easy to 
prove, without any doubt, that in Belarus there is a gradual, even slow but clearly 
visible increase in importance and political power of the Belarusian democratic 
opposition, thanks to its existence and activities it could be anticipated that in not 
too distance future there will be signifi cant changes towards democratization of 
the political system.
It seems that there are at least a few reasons for past failures in the EU policy 
towards Belarus. Firstly, the EU has no coherent policy towards Belarus, namely 
a strategy which is thought through and accepted by its Member States and institu-
tions, which would not be politics on “paper’’, rather it would be supported by 
continuous, systematic and consistent actions with the involvement of specifi c 
measures. Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which signifi es the formal institu-
tional strengthening of the EU in the sphere of external relations, gives a chance 
that this situation will change. However, it does not mean it will happen for sure. 
Apart from the existence of formal legal and institutional framework, political will 
and readiness are also necessary in order to take decisive and consequent action.
Secondly, Belarus and the policy towards this country get very little attention 
from vast majority of the EU member states and the EU institutions. Belarus has 
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neither stand for the EU membership, nor manifested any signs of internal instabil-
ity, and therefore has not occupied much attention of institutions and leaders of 
the EU 33. According to Alan Mayhew, aft er the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Eastern Europe was plunged into chaos; however, this has not been an immediate 
threat to the EU, and therefore the EU’s response to the challenges that emerged 
in Eastern Europe was rather weak 34. Th e EU policy towards Belarus is mainly 
“reactive’’, i.e. the EU reacts and takes some action against Belarus only if there are 
any abnormal events in the country, there is no initiative in the EU policy towards 
Belarus. As a result, if the Belarusian “case” is not especially “urgent’’, the EU lacks 
motivation to pay more attention, time and resources to it. It seems that activities, 
as mentioned earlier visit of Foreign Ministers of Germany and Poland in Novem-
ber 2010, could be an example of such attempts to engage more actively in measures 
against Belarus. When taking into account the events and A.Lukaszeko’s actions 
aft er the elections on 19 December 2010, the visit can hardly be recognized as 
successful; however, the attempt was made; an alternative behaviour would have 
been passivity and not doing what could have been attempted to do.
Th irdly, “cumbersome’’ of Belarus to the EU is a result of the fact that the EU 
does not have a very eff ective means of aff ecting the internal situation in that 
country, which eff ects could be noticeable not aft er a very long period of time. Th e 
most eff ective instrument has been and still is the prospect of adoption of the 
country to the EU. But the problem is that Belarus does not declare willingness to 
join the EU, which means that the most eff ective tool of the EU to infl uence the 
countries with their immediate neighbours in the case of Belarus remains, at least 
for the time being, useless. Another theoretically possible tool of pressure to use 
on A. Lukashenko’s regime – more or less severe economic sanctions – is a subject 
to certain risks. Th ey would bring loss for the EU companies trading with Belarus 
and would negatively impact the fi nancial situation of Belarusians working in 
companies cooperating economically with companies from the EU. Th ere would 
also be a probability of the Belarusian authorities trying to use the transit position 
of their country for energy supplies from Russia. Th e EU economic restrictions 
would probably bind Belarus and Russia even more. In the end, it would probably 
be used by Lukashenko’s regime as propaganda – he could blame the EU for 
33 C. Guicherd, Th e UE and Belarus: From a Zero to a Positive Sum Game, [in:] Th e EU & Belarus. 
Between Moscow and Brussels, ed. A. Lewis, London 2002, p. 318.
34 A. Mayhew, Ukraine and the European Union: Financing Accelerating Integration, Warsaw 2008, 
p. 11. 
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worsening the economic situation in Belarus and consolidate the Belarusian 
society, arguing that it is “the EU’s fault’’. It is doubtful; however, whether economic 
sanctions would prompt larger groups of Belarusian society to take action to change 
the authorities in their country.
Fourthly, there is still a lack of strong and well organized partner in Belarus for 
the EU’s eff orts aimed at democratization in the country. Democratic opposition 
is relatively small, fragmented and weak. Th e fact that next to A. Lukashenko there 
were nine candidates in the election in 2010 is very compelling. In Belarus, there 
is a lack of a strong and infl uential environment, social organization or a leader 
around whom the focus would be on seeking to change the political situation. 
A very large part of Belarusian society remains passive and does not demonstrate 
any willingness to fi ght for changes in the existing political system. Political or 
economic elites and other benefi ciaries of the current system fi nd themselves well 
in this reality and do not seem to be willing to take the risk of a deeper change. 
Simultaneously, the President A. Lukashenko’s domestic policy, aiming to maintain 
himself in power and keeping the status quo is, at least so far, eff ective. He propiti-
ates supporters and ensures their loyalty with material privileges, positions in the 
administration and his departments, etc. In addition, he uses more or less severe 
but eff ective repression on political opposition, independent media, non-govern-
mental organizations, etc. As it can be assumed so far, A. Lukashenko has “done 
his homework” on cause of the collapse of non-democratic systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe countries, which broke not when they were the most repressive 
but usually just when attempts were made to reforms and alleviate the internal 
policy. No doubt the president’s domestic policy of Belarus had also been infl uenced 
by so called “colourful revolutions” and the events in Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova. Th erefore, A. Lukashenko is trying to avoid emergence and strengthen-
ing of any environments that could become strong and long lasting centres of 
opposition to his regime, and consequently he remains in no reform policy-
making, which could at the fi rst glance seem small, but in the long run could lead 
to changes over which he would no longer be able to control.
It is worth noting that with no doubt, A. Lukashenko is a very diffi  cult opponent 
for the EU. If it is assumed that the main aim of his policy is to stay in power and 
counteract changes in the political situation in Belarus, which could culminate in 
the emergence of the threat of losing this power, then so far his policy is eff ective. 
A. Lukashenko has been in this position since 1994 which is a relatively long time. 
During this time, not once appeared a real possibility of him losing his power. In 
his policy, Lukashenko very smoothly balances between the main “players” whose 
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actions and behaviour could have a signifi cant impact on the situation in Belarus, 
i.e. EU, Russia and the Belarusian society, skilfully drawing into the game any of 
these sites in order to strengthen his position against the other and get the best 
results. Manifestations of A. Lukashenko’s lenient policies towards Belarus opposi-
tion, is supposed to improve Belarusian President’s image in the eyes of the EU and 
show that he is a politician worth talking with. Improving the EU – Belarus rela-
tions means strengthening the position of the latter in A. Lukashenko’s policy 
toward Russia and specifi c “rate increase’’ in the policy-game with that country. 
Th is, in turn, is to maximize economic benefi ts from the Belarus-Russia coopera-
tion, which is very important for the Belarusian economy. Th e warming of the 
Belarus-Russia relations for A. Lukashenko means more room for manoeuvre in 
his policy towards the EU. Without a doubt, crucial for the Belarusian president’s 
activities aft er the elections on 19 December 2010 was signed agreement on 9 
December 2010 concerning the creation of joint economic space by Belarus, Rus-
sia and Kazakhstan. Th e better the economic situation in Belarus (or lack of its 
rapid deterioration) – both through close economic cooperation with Russia as 
well as exchanges with the EU member states – the stronger the position of the 
Belarusian President in the game with mentioned subjects and the easier it is for 
him to stay in power. Improvement of the relations between Belarus and the EU 
or Russia is used by A. Lukashenka as propaganda in domestic politics towards the 
faithful electorate, and is to show how the Belarusian president is an eff ective and 
enjoying international respect politician.
Th e brutal hearing of A. Lukashenko and the opposition aft er the elections on 
19 December 2010 was, however, very risky step for this politician. On the one 
hand, such actions represent intimidation of the public and the opposition, and 
probably, at least for a certain period of time, less tendency to active political 
actions. On the other hand, such actions also mean a very serious deterioration in 
the Belarus-EU relations. At least in the near future, the EU will probably not get 
“caught up’’ in a game with the Belarusian president and without real, concrete and 
lasting concessions from Lukashenko it will not soft en its policy on Belarus. 
Especially that the Belarusian President’s actions aft er the elections on 19 Decem-
ber 2010 signifi ed not only the failure of the EU policy towards Belarus, but also 
took into account the suspension of sanctions from October 2010, and especially 
the visit of Foreign Ministers of Poland and Germany at the beginning of Novem-
ber of 2010 – prestigious defeat of the EU.
In the context of the EU policies towards Belarus it is necessary to reiterate one 
more very important circumstance. Th e point is that the expectations under which 
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Lukashenko would agree to democratization of the system (or lead to it) are prob-
ably not very realistic. It would be associated with the threat of the politician’s 
power loss, which in turn could be very risky for him personally. Aft er the loss 
(return) of the power, he could somehow be held accountable for his activities in 
the period of his presidency. It seems that the EU politicians and institutions should 
in their actions – which aim at change of the current situation in Belarus – take 
this fact into consideration and more carefully approach to the signals sent by Mr 
Lukashenko and the people around him who give the impression of readiness to 
change their policy. Such sort of Lukashenko’s activities is probably a part of the 
game, to strengthen his position towards Russia and the Belarusian society. Truly 
dangerous situation for the president of Belarus would be a situation where, in 
addition to the EU policy aimed at change in Belarus, Russia would strongly and 
consistently start seeking the same and that would strengthen and consolidate 
Belarusian opposition. At present, it seems that the EU can do in its policy towards 
Belarus is to focus on comprehensive assistance for Belarusian opposition and 
promote the development and strengthening of the Belarusian society. In favour-
able internal and external circumstances in Belarus, such actions may prove 
essential for change in this country.
